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Serving This Time: Examining the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
After a Decade of Experience-
DeanellReece Tacha"
I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored by your invitation to deliver the annual Earl F. Nelson Lecture
at the University of Missouri School of Law, where I follow many distinguished
speakers who have brought to you important perspectives on public policy, the
judicial system, and the law. Today I ask you to look with me at the law through
the lens of criminal sentencing. I have picked my title carefully with the
intentional double entendre. On one hand, I want to convey my thoughts about
the federal sentencing guidelines, which I think have generally "served this time?'
in our nation's history by reflecting the concerns and will of the public and of
our elected representatives. The title also has a personal meaning, however. I
speak to you today as a member of the United States Sentencing Commission,
a position I was appointed to by President Clinton nearly three years ago. I view
my service on this Commission as a form of "serving my time" because this is
ajob for which I did not campaign, for which I am no more qualified than any
of my colleagues on the federal courts of appeals, and which I did not need in
combination with the heavy press of my circuit court duties. Nonetheless, I
agreed to serve and have had the challenge of looking at the law from the very
difficult perspective of sentencing.
* Earl F. Nelson Lecture. University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, March
21, 1997.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge
Tacha is also serving as a Commissioner on the United States Sentencing Commission.
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Today, I challenge you to think with me about the job of determining
sentences. Ask yourself, if you will, what is the proper sentence for a particular
crime? What are our goals? Which crimes are more or less serious? What
aspects of individual defendants' histories should be taken into account? The
task of setting sentencing policy, and indeed of sentencing individual defendants,
is one in which a host of social, legal, ethical, and quite personal issues
converge. In order to see this, I ask you to look at a sentence from a variety of
perspectives. If you were given the opportunity to establish the sentence for a
particular defendant who had committed a serious crime, you would no doubt
have one view if you were the victim of that crime. You would likely have a
very different view if the perpetrator was your seventeen-year-old son or
daughter. What would you think if the victim was your mother or an elderly
relative? You might have still another view if you were a member of the
community reading about the crime in the local newspaper. Or, consider your
perspective as a taxpayer who sees his tax bill rising as a result of the ever-
increasing need to build more prisons. Finally, if you were the defendant, what
sentence would you think was fair and just? In order to fully understand the
multitude of issues involved in sentencing policy, it is important for all of us to
think about sentencing from the various perspectives involved. This has been
one of the most challenging assignments of my entire career, but I have come to
understand the difficulty and ambivalence with which we all approach the
process of punishing those who have broken the law.
I suppose it is fitting for me to be here to reflect on a decade of experience
with the federal sentencing guidelines just as you are beginning to embark on
your own odyssey of guideline sentencing in the Missouri state courts. As many
of you may know, about half of the states in the country have already adopted
some form of sentencing guidelines and I understand that yours went into effect
just about a month ago. The goals and structure of the Missouri guidelines are
very similar to those of the federal sentencing guidelines, but there are also some
very significant differences between the two which, in part, reflect the
differences in state and federal jurisdiction over crime.
First, Missouri, like most states, has limited resources to devote to its
criminal justice system and it has reached a political consensus that one of the
purposes of its guidelines is to ensure the rational use of correctional resources.
The nation as a whole has not yet reached such a consensus, in part because the
federal government has historically had jurisdiction over a relatively small
number of crimes and has had the resources to punish federal offenders without
significant resource restrictions. But as more and more crimes become
federalized, and as concern over balancing the federal budget takes center stage,
the landscape in which federal sentencing policy is made has changed
significantly. As I will discuss in more detail in a moment, I predict the federal
government will face many of the same concerns about resource allocation in the
coming years that the states already have.
[Vol. 62
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Another notable difference between the two systems is that the Missouri
guidelines, like those of other states, are comparatively simple because they
cover fewer and simpler criminal statutes than the federal guidelines, which
relate to a large number and variety of crimes. And, of course, the increasing
federalization of crime continues to add to the complexity of the federal code and
the guidelines.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Missouri guidelines are advisory rather
than mandatory like the federal guidelines. The rationale for mandatory
guidelines is based on the concern that the goals of sentencing reform would not
be achieved ifjudges could disregard the guidelines and instead exercise the very
discretion that prompted sentencing reform in the first place. But a decade later,
many are still debating this assumption and I expect this will be a fruitful area
for comparative study after the Missouri guidelines have been in effect for some
time. Despite these differences, however, there are many important similarities
between the two schemes and I hope some of my comments today will prove to
be informative with respect to both.
After a decade of experience with the federal sentencing guidelines, there
are, of course, several important issues that deserve careful consideration. But,
because it is impossible to cover the waterfront today, I want to focus my
comments and observations on where the Sentencing Commission and the
guidelines may go as we embark on a second decade of federal guideline
sentencing. There is no question that the second decade will present very
different challenges from the first. The first Commission faced the enormous
challenge of creating and implementing the most comprehensive system of
sentencing reform in our history. On the heels of that accomplishment, it was
faced with defending an onslaught of constitutional challenges and criticisms as
it sought to train criminal justice practitioners and court personnel to use the
-guidelines. After the Supreme Court reaffimed the constitutionality of both the
Commission and the guidelines,' the Commission spent the next several years
amending the guidelines in response to legislative directives and ad hoc requests
from various groups, and based on its own assessment of ways in which the
guidelines needed to be modified. All in all, the Commission has already passed
more than 500 amendments.
As stability in federal sentencing begins to emerge, however, it is important
that the Commission takes a step back to reassess the guidelines objectively in
light of all of the changes we have seen in society, in criminal activity, and in
crime policy over the past decade. I think it is fair to say that, in the next decade,
the Commission's focus will be less on the legitimacy and continued existence
of the guidelines as a whole and more on research and selective revision of the
guidelines.2 The Commission will not revisit the guidelines anew, nor will it
1. See Mistrettav. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
2. The Commission has a statutory duty to periodically "review and revise" the
19971
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continue to amend the guidelines at the same pace or with the same emphasis on
marginal improvements as we have in the past. Instead, I would like to see the
Commission engage in thoughtful deliberation about significant issues that may
warrant reconsideration and revision in light of the changing circumstances we
have witnessed over the past decade. Thus, we will not ask whether the current
guidelines could somehow be improved-of course they could-but rather,
whether they advance the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act and evolving
federal crime policy. As we do so, it is imperative that we look beyond the four
comers of the Guidelines Manual itself and draw on the knowledge and
experience that the Commission and others have acquired over the last decade
by expanding research and creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue
with others involved in sentencing.
Before I get into specifies about what I would like to see the Commission
do in the next decade, I think it is important to give you some background about
federal sentencing reform, the goals of sentencing and the sentencing guidelines
themselves.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM AND
THE CREATION OF THE GUIDELINES
Throughout most of our nation's history, judges had virtually unfettered
discretion to impose sentences based on their own individual notions of justice
and their own sense of what information was relevant in a given case.3 In the
early 19th Century, most states adopted criminal statutes that established fixed
terms of imprisonment in order to incapacitate criminals and to provide sufficient
time for offenders to be rehabilitated. At the federal level, Congress set statutory
maximum penalties, but federal judges retained full discretion to select any
sentence below the statutory maximum. In the early 20th Century, Congress
created an even more indeterminate sentencing scheme by establishing a parole
system under which all three branches of government played a role. Congress
set statutory maximum sentences, judges selected and imposed individual
sentences within statutory bounds, and parole officials within the Executive
sentencing guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994); Braxton v. United States, 500
U.S. 344,348-49 (1991).
3. For discussions about the history of criminal sentencing and sentencing reform,
see United States Sentencing Commission, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report
on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term limpacts on Disparity In
Sentencing, Uuse ofIncarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining,
9-14 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter Sentencing Commission Evaluation Report], William W.
Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A
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Branch determined the ultimate length of imprisonment by decidihg when to
release prisoners.
By the 1970s, several independent factors converged to make sentencing
a central focus of criminal justice reform efforts. First, civil rights activists and
others became increasingly concerned about the disparity that resulted from
indeterminate sentencing, which appeared to reflect the offenders' personal
characteristics-particularly race and class-more than the seriousness of the
offense or other legitimate grounds for punishment. Second, political
conservatives also were concerned about indeterminate sentencing and wanted
to supplant what they saw as judicial leniency with strict and enforceable
sentencing standards. Third, social science research showing that incarceration
and corrections programs had not successfully reduced recidivism called into
question the dominant rehabilitative model of sentencing. And finally,
consistent with other legal reforms of the era, there was an interest in shifting
away from a common law of sentencing (and substantive criminal law, for that
matter) to a more rule-based system that was thought to be more rational and
subject to greater accountability.4
Reflecting these concerns, Congress began what would prove to be a
decade-long effort to reform the federal sentencing laws. The legislative history
reveals a broad range of concerns and views about the need for sentencing
reform-with some advocating the elimination of unwarranted leniency and
others concerned about undue severity. Regardless of their individual views,
however, they shared an overriding concern about the apparent disparity and
inequality that resulted from an indeterminate sentencing system, where similar
defendants who committed similar crimes could receive very different sentences.
The vast majority shared an interest in shiffing from an indeterminate system to
a determinate system, under which people would know the basis for a sentence
and that the sentence imposed would, by-and-large, be the sentence served. In
1984, after more than ten years of study and debate, Congress overwhelmingly
passed the Sentencing Reform Act,5 which brought about the most far-reaching
reforms in federal sentencing that this nation has ever seen. The Sentencing
Reform Act abolished parole and introduced a comprehensive new sentencing
scheme to ensure that federal sentencing satisfied the goals of certainty,
uniformity and fairness, while furthering the traditional purposes of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment and rehabilitation. 6
4. Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps
Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 170 (1995); see generally Sentencing Commission
Evaluation Report, supra note 3, at 9-11.
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742
(1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994)).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994); United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual, 1-10 (Nov. 1995).
19971
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To achieve these goals, the Sentencing Reform Act created the United
States Sentencing Commission, which in turn created the federal sentencing
guidelines. The guidelines went into effect in 1987 and, although they have been
amended more than 500 times, the basic structure and operation has remained
intact. The guidelines are designed so that ajudge measures the seriousness of
a defendant's offense and the extent of his criminal history in order to select the
sentence he should receive. The seriousness of the offense is based on a
combination of factors, including:
• the offense of conviction (e.g., robbery, drug trafficking, fraud);
specific aggravating or mitigating conduct that occurs during the offense of
conviction (e.g., the amount of money taken, use of a gun, bodily injury);
and
other adjustments for factors that are relevant regardless of the type of
offense involved (e.g., the victim's vulnerability, the defendant's role in the
offense, obstruction ofjustice, acceptance of responsibility).
A defendant's criminal history score reflects the number, seriousness and
recency of his prior offenses.
These two considerations-offense seriousness and criminal history-are
represented along the two axes of the sentencing table, whichljudges use to select
a final sentence. The table is a grid with the offense levels running along the
vertical axis and the criminal history levels running along the horizontal axis.
The point at which a given offense level and criminal history score intersect on
the grid shows the range of months from which the judge can choose a specific
sentence.
The judge may depart from the sentencing range and impose a higher or
lower sentence only if there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
have not been adequately taken into account by the Commission in formulating
the guidelines. On the rationale that it would undermine the principal goals of
the Sentencing Reform Act, ajudge may not depart simply because she thinks
the final sentencing range is too harsh or too lenient. However, she is given
flexibility to depart when faced with an extraordinary or atypical case.'
Finally, the judge must determine whether the guideline sentence is
consistent with the statutory maximum and minimum sentences mandated by
Congress. The guidelines were drafted to achieve some parity with mandatory
sentences, but if the guideline sentence is inconsistent with a mandatory
7. See generally, Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson,
Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential
Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 305-32 (1996).
476 [Vol. 62
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sentence, the mandatory sentence will trump the guidelines. Thus, a defendant
who is sentenced for drug trafficking, and based on the seriousness of the offense
and her criminal history would receive a guideline sentence of between 46 and
57 months, could nevertheless receive a 60-month sentence if it were mandated
by the relevant statute.
HI. FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY IN THE SECOND DECADE
Since the guidelines took effect ten years ago, we have witnessed some
dramatic changes in criminal activity and in the federal government's role in
crime policy. As the Sentencing Commission embarks on the next decade, it is
important that the Commission reevaluates and revises the guidelines as
necessary to respond to these changing circumstances and to ensure that federal
sentencing policy is consistent with the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act and
the evolving national crime strategy. The Commission has a unique role in the
federal system as an independent, expert agency that has been given the broad
statutory authority-and the responsibility-to rationalize sentencing policy. In
assuming that role, it must not operate in a vacuum. Rather than simply taking
the existing guidelines as the baseline from which to make changes, the
Commission must look beyond its own institutional memory and the guidelines
themselves and learn from the laboratories in which the guidelines have been
operating over the course of the last decade. This will mean both expanding our
capacity for rigorous research and working systematically with other
governmental entities involved in the development of federal crime policy.
A. Reevaluating the Sentencing Guidelines
as Circumstances Change
A number of factors have changed the context in which the guidelines
operate over the course of the past ten years. First, we have seen a major shift
in the roles that the states and the federal government play in criminal law and
policy. For the most part, crime has historically been a matter of state concern.
The federal government was primarily interested in criminal activity that
implicated interstate or international commerce, and the states prosecuted most
drug offenses, violent crime, and property offenses. Beginning in the 1980s,
however, Congress began to pursue more of a "get tough" policy on crime and
federalized a number of different crimes, most notably drug offenses and many
violent crimes. Although we have seen widespread federalization of other laws
that traditionally fell within the purview of the states' police powers since the
New Deal, this marked a significant change in the area of criminal law. In
addition to expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction, the federal government's
"get tough" attitude has been reflected in more severe sentences and in an
increase in the use of statutory mandatory minimum sentences.
19971
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At the same time we are increasing the number of federal crimes, we are
also facing concerns about balancing the federal budget and significantly
limiting federal spending. This in turn raises questions about how best to
allocate scarce federal resources for law enforcement, as well as judicial and
prison resources. Recognizing that the resources of the federal criminal justice
system are becoming increasingly limited, it may be time for the federal
government to reevaluate its role in the criminal justice system and to reassess
federal priorities. As this happens, the Commission must also reassess federal
sentencing policy to ensure that it continues to be consistent with federal
priorities.
Finally, over the course of the last decade, we have seen significant changes
in the federal prison population which may require some reassessment of the
extent to which federal sentencing policy is furthering the fundamental goals of
sentencing. For example, as the federal government has assumed jurisdiction
over drug offenses and more property crimes, we are seeing younger defendants
prosecuted in the federal system. This raises new questions about how best to
achieve the fundamental goals of sentencing (e.g., What effectively deters young
people? Should we place more emphasis on rehabilitation if we are going to
release people who are still relatively young even though they have served long
sentences?). It also raises questions about whether we should develop a national
crime control strategy that rationalizes the roles of the federal and state
governments in fighting crime and handling young offenders (e.g., Is it better to
leave younger defendants to the states which may be able to provide social
services more effectively?).
It is important for the Commission to periodically reassess federal
sentencing policy in order to reflect changes in the national will with respect to
the goals of sentencing and how they should be prioritized as time passes and
conditions change. This will not be easy. We have always harbored uncertainty
about sentencing goals and priorities because criminal activity is inherently hard
to study and understand and the goals of sentencing often come into conflict.
The original Sentencing Commission struggled with many of these issues in
drafting the guidelines,8 and I expect future Commissions also will struggle as
they periodically reevaluate federal sentencing policy to determine whether it is
advancing the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act and evolving federal criminal
policy.
8. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRAL. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988).
[Vol. 62
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B. The Commission's Role in Shaping Federal Sentencing Policy
1. Redefining the Commission's Role
As we enter the next decade, the Commission must take steps to grow into
its role as an independent expert agency. The Commission must be more
proactive in setting its own agenda, rather than primarily responding to specific,
ad hoc concerns of Congress and various interest groups. In doing so, the
Commission should focus less on the annual amendment cycle, which is often
characterized by dozens of marginal amendments to the existing text, and more
on a limited number of issues that it has determined are of substantial
importance and warrant thoughtful consideration based on research and an
assessment of whether guideline modifications are necessary to accomplish the
goals of sentencing. The Commission should also assume more of a leadership
role in shaping federal sentencing policy generally by systematically channeling
relevant information to and from other institutions involved in the development
of crime policy and by facilitating collaboration among these different entities.
In providing leadership, the Commission must listen to political will, but not be
bound by it. Finally, the Commission must do more to fulfill its statutory
obligation to serve as a clearinghouse for data and information about federal
sentencing. The Commission has very valuable data as a result of monitoring
every case sentenced in the federal system (of which there were approximately
43,000 in 1996), and it is important that we make these data and resources
available and accessible to academics and others in the criminal justice
community.
2. Emphasizing Research
Research is of primary importance in helping the Commission set its own
priorities and as a link to outside organization. It is imperative that, as we
evaluate federal sentencing policy in light of changing circumstances, we have
full information about what those circumstances are and how successful the
guidelines are in achieving sentencing goals under those circumstances.
I implore those who follow me on the Commission, as well as other policy
makers who make decisions related to the sentencing guidelines and the
Commission, to look carefully at the very valuable data the Commission has
collected over the past decade. I think it would be fair to say that there has never
been a better database on individual defendants, the sentencing process, and
sentences imposed. It is a rich resource from which not only the Commission
but academics, policy makers, and concerned citizens should turn to try to
understand in more objective ways the criminal element in our society and the
1997]
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important role that sentencing policy should play in crime control strategy at
both the federal and state levels.
The Commission can benefit from other types of research as well. For
example, we have received the results of two national surveys which provide
meaningful information about areas that may warrant further research and
consideration. The first report was based on a national survey that was designed
to find out how American citizens outside of the criminal justice system would
themselves sentence defendants convicted in federal court.9 The report
compared public perceptions about what would constitute a proper sentence to
the guideline sentence that a hypothetical defendant would actually receive. In
general, the survey showed that guideline sentences are largely consistent with
public opinion. For example, the public thinks sentences should be based on
what kind of crime the defendant committed, not on who they are, which is one
of the central principles of the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines. The
public thinks you shouild get a longer sentence if you have a history of criminal
conduct, but they think blunt rules like "three-strikes-and-you're-out' are too
harsh and that judges should have more flexibility. This view is more consistent
with guideline sentencing than with mandatory sentences imposed by statute.
:Whe public thinks economic harms are not as bad as causing personal injury, and
the guidelines reflect this distinction. There are, of course, areas of
disagreement, particularly with respect to drug trafficking where guideline
sentences are typically much harsher than sentences selected by respondents.
The public survey and the report analyzing it were both commissioned by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to our statutory obligation to study the extent
to which the guidelines have achieved the goals of sentencing, 10 and they provide
valuable insight into the public will regarding three of those goals-just
punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.
This study also provides some interesting insight into where we might draw
the line between federal and state roles in criminal policy. The survey revealed
significant regional differences in what kinds of sentences people think are
appropriate. This, of course, is one reason we have the guidelines-to counter
unwarranted disparity based simply on where you live. But, it also raises
questions about whether sentencing policy should somehow reflect this
geographic variation-not in the form of disparity within the federal
system-but as a measure of where to draw the line between state and federal
9. See Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, Public Opinion on Sentencing Federal
Crimes (1995) (on file with the United States Sentencing Commission). Sentencing
Commission staffalso analyzed the survey data and issued a Research Bulletin which can
be obtained from the Sentencing Commission. See Linda D. Maxfield, Willie Martin &
Christine Kitchens, Just Punishment: Public Perceptions and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISsION RESEARCH BULLETIN (1997).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2) (1994).
[Vol. 62
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jurisdiction over crime. In other words, it may be appropriate to let public will
be reflected in sentences at the state level in a way it would not be at the national
level because there is no such national consensus.
The second survey I mentioned was conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center in an effort to assess systematically the views and experiences of federal
judges and probation officers who work with the sentencing guidelines on a
daily basis.1 Overall, the survey showed that there is no groundswell of support
for a major overhaul ofthe guidelines. In addition, the majority of respondents
said that, although they would prefer advisory guidelines over mandatory
guidelines, they also prefer some type of guideline system to the purely
discretionary sentencing that existed previously. Despite this general acceptance
ofthe guidelines, however, they did identify a number of areas where they would
like to see changes. The number one interest was in increasing judicial
discretion and opportunities for judges to depart from the guideline sentencing
range. They also expressed concern that the discretion that used to belong to
judges had shifted to prosecutors who they think have too much control over
sentences, especially in the context ofplea bargains which many see as a source
of hidden disparity in the guidelines system. Judges also expressed an interest
in disassociating the sentencing guidelines from statutory mandatory minimum
sentences, especially in the area of drug trafficking where sentences are closely
tied to the quantity of drug involved. Finally, they expressed widespread interest
in having the guidelines amended less frequently and in having fewer
amendments each cycle in order to give the law a chance to stabilize within the
courts.
Even from these brief summaries, I think it is immediately apparent that
both of these studies provide valuable information to the Commission about how
the guidelines are working and about areas where research and reassessment may
be called for. Perhaps even more striking, however, is the extent to which these
areas call for a collaborative effort between the Sentencing Commission and all
three branches of the federal government-not only because it would provide the
Commission with valuable information from other perspectives-but because
change in almost all of these areas would require some action by the other
branches of government as well as the Commission.
3. Collaborating With Others To Shape
Federal Sentencing Policy
Federal sentencing policy must be part of a coordinated national crime
control strategy and should be designed to further the goals of that strategy. In
11. See Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, United States Sentencing
Guidelines: Results ofthe Federal Judicial Center's Survey, REPORT TO THE COMMITrEE
ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1997).
1997]
11
Tacha: Tacha: Serving This Time:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOUR LA W REVIEW
shaping the policy-and reshaping it over time as conditions change-the
Commission must work with other governmental agencies in order to coordinate
our efforts. Some forms of inter-agency exchange are mandated by the
Sentencing Reform Act' and are already used. For example, the Executive
Branch is represented on the Commission by two nonvoting ex officio members
and the Commission periodically meets and consults with the Committee on
Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which represents
the federal judiciary before the Commission. The Sentencing Commission has
also established a Judicial Advisory Group to complement the Practitioners'
Advisory Group from which it routinely seeks and receives recommendations
about guideline sentencing. All of these provide useful opportunities to
exchange information, but it is important that the Commission maximizes these
opportunities by consulting with these representatives as it is setting priorities
and considering possible policy changes or amendments to the guidelines.
I think the Commission should also institutionalize other means of
communication and collaboration so that different institutional perspectives and
information are channeled to and from the Sentencing Commission in the most
constructive way. As we all know, legislators and judges view the law from
very different vantage points, making decisions in different contexts and based
on different information. Congress is, of course, faced with the challenge of
setting national policies ex ante with the expectation that, overall, they will
achieve the intended results. Judges, on the other hand, apply the guidelines in
ihe context of particular cases or controversies and are thus uniquely able to
assess how well they work as they seek to impose ajust and lawful sentence in
each individual case. Likewise, many within the Department of Justice have
valuable experience and information, including prosecutors who work with the
guidelines on a daily basis but have a different perspective than judges. In
addition, the Bureau of Prisons has valuable information about the effects of the
sentencing guidelines on the prison population and the prospects for
rehabilitation and transition of defendants back into society. The Justice
Department also has several research agencies of its own that gather and analyze
institutional data and knowledge. The Sentencing Commission is in a unique
position to bridge the gap between these different vantage points in order to
rationalize federal sentencing and it is important that we develop in this role.
This would not only ensure more informed policy making by the Commission,
but would also increase congressional and judicial confidence in the Commission
and the guidelines.
Besides expanding the scope and frequency of our workaday interaction
and collaboration, I think it would be valuable to all of these institutional players
for the Sentencing Commission to host periodic conferences where judges and
representatives from the Legislative and Executive Branches gather to discuss
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 994(o) (1994).
[Vol. 62
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important issues in federal crime policy and to work together to set priorities and
discuss possible solutions. While sentencing policy is the Commission's primary
concern, it should be considered in the broader context of an evolving national
crime control strategy. To the extent we are faced with the need to rationalize
the respective roles of states and the federal government in a unified strategy,
similar conferences with state and federal representatives also would be valuable.
Of course, I do not expect that these different parties will agree on all issues as
a matter of course-if they did, the enterprise would be meaningless-but, to the
extent they can help clarify the national will over crime and sentencing policy,
and do so in a thoughtful and collaborative way, we would all benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
I conclude, after three very difficult years of membership on the United
States Sentencing Commission, that the federal guidelines have, by and large,
"served this time" by addressing the concerns of the public and of the Legislative
Branch. I hope that future sentencing commissioners and policy makers will use
the Commission's very valuable data to learn from this first decade of experience
with guideline sentencing. We must take a hard look at the many complex
variables involved in sentencing policy and how they may or may not effect our
criminal justice goals as a society. The kind of analysis I suggest and welcome
will require a concerted will to look honestly and carefully at the data to
determine what policy directions we should take. It is no easy task, particularly
the task of setting aside the perspective from which each of us view sentencing
and trying to ask broadly whether the sentencing policies we pursue truly "serve
this time."
Finally, today I have focused primarily on the roles of governmental
institutions and officials in federal sentencing reform, which is in no way meant
to minimize the critical role that lawyers play, not only in sentencing reform, but
in the sentencing process itself. Ourjustice system depends on the participation
of competent and conscientious lawyers who represent those who are brought
before the courts, and this is no more important than in the criminal justice
system where peoples' fundamental rights and liberties are so directly at stake.
For those of you who are interested in criminal law, there is no question that
sentencing guidelines are complex and that it is a challenge to learn to use them
well, but it is imperative that you do so because they will be as important to the
outcome of your clients' cases as the substantive law. Whether you practice in
state or federal court, on behalf of the prosecution or defense, I encourage all of
you to take up this challenge.
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